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3. Background: Key Historical Figures in Rabbinic Law

To understand the debates surrounding Noahide law and when Christians are introduced to Jewish scholars, these writings are from different timelines, and they did not all agree with one another. Their positions therefore cannot simply be combined into one statement called “the Jewish position.”

Maimonides – Second-century Rabbi Moses ben Maimon

Maimonides (1138–1204), known in Hebrew as Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon and commonly called Rambam, was one of the most influential Jewish philosophers, physicians, and legal scholars of the Middle Ages. His monumental legal code, the Mishneh Torah, systematically organised Jewish law into a comprehensive legal framework.

The section Hilchot Melachim uMilchamot means “Laws of Kings and Wars.” It contains Maimonides’ treatment of kingship, the Messiah, Israel’s obligations, and the laws that apply to non-Jews. Maimonides’ treatment of Noahide law is especially important because he presents the Seven Commandments and claims they are divinely grounded obligations and connects faithful observance with the category he calls the “pious among the nations” and with a share in the World to Come (Olam Ha-Ba).⁴

Maimonides’ formulation in Hilchot Melachim 8:11 is especially significant because he distinguishes between observing the commandments because they were commanded by God through Moses and observing them merely because human reason considers them morally useful.⁵

This distinction will become particularly important in Chapter 4.

Rabbeinu Tam and the Tosafists

Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbi Jacob ben Meir (c. 1100–1171), was a leading 12th-century French Jewish scholar and one of the most influential members of the group known as the Tosafists. Source: Wikipedia

The Tosafists were medieval Jewish commentators who wrote analytical additions and discussions on the Talmud. Their writings frequently examine contradictions between Talmudic passages and develop detailed legal distinctions, In rabbinic tradition, when scholars speak of “legal distinctions” (Halakhic distinctions), they are not referring to secular state law, civil statutes, or courtroom legislation as understood in modern Western society.

Instead, Talmudic “law” is a system of religious jurisprudence; this is a framework that categorises human actions, beliefs, and obligations in relation to God and covenantal duty.

Summary Comparison

Concept	Secular Law	Talmudic Legal Distinctions (Halakha)
Source	Human legislatures, constitutions, and civil courts.	Torah, Oral Tradition, and Rabbinic interpretation.
Domain	Civil order, taxation, statutory crime, and public policy.	Spiritual duty, moral obligations, worship, and covenantal status.
Enforcement	Police, civil judges, state prisons, and secular courts.	Conscience, religious community identity, and spiritual standing before God.

This distinction in the chart above helps you understand that when medieval scholars debated Noahide “law,” they were engaging in religious and theological jurisprudence, not writing civil legislation for secular governments.

One important issue in this literature is the concept of shittuf In Jewish theological jurisprudence (Halakha), it refers to a specific religious posture: worshipping the Creator while associating another entity, partner, or intermediary alongside Him. Source: Wikipedia.

Judaism’s views of the Trinity doctrine

In all branches of Judaism, the God of the Hebrew Bible is considered one absolute, singular entity, defined as no other deity beside Yahweh himself, without any divisions or plurality within (while some Kabbalistic sources speak of distinct “emanations” of God, these are seen as different windows through which Jews perceive a singular God). In general, Jews reject any conception of a coequal, multi-person godhead; anything but an absolute monotheism is contrary to the Shema.^[6] Citing examples for “echad” in the Hebrew Bible as being either just one king, one house, one garden, one army, or one man, etc. Also, they reject the notion that somehow there are “traces of the Trinity” in the Hebrew word elohim. Jewish polemics against the Trinity date almost from its very conception. Even in the Talmud, Simlai (3rd century) declared, in refutation of the “heretics,” “The three words ‘El,’ ‘Elohim,’ and ‘YHWH‘ (Josh. xxii. 22) connote one and the same person, as one might say, ‘King, Emperor, Augustus'” (Yer. Ber. ix. 12d).^[7] This view is espoused by Judaism’s most revered credo, the Shema.

One of the best-known statements of Rabbinical Judaism on monotheism occurs in Maimonides‘ 13 principles of faith, Second Principle:

God, the Cause of all, is one. This does not mean one as in one of a pair, nor one like a species (which encompasses many individuals), nor one as in an object that is made up of many elements, nor as a single simple object that is infinitely divisible. Rather, God is a unity unlike any other possible unity. This is referred to in the Torah (Deuteronomy 6:4): “Hear Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is one.” Source: Wikipedia.

That touches on a critical concern at the very heart of this discussion. From a Christian perspective, any belief system, regardless of how ethical or moral it appears on the surface, that denies the deity, incarnation, atonement, or exclusive lordship of Jesus Christ is fundamentally incompatible with the Gospel.

When evaluating the Noahide movement through a New Testament lens, a few key biblical principles highlight why Christians must exercise careful discernment:

The Rema – Rabbi Moses Isserles

Rabbi Moses Isserles (c. 1530–1572), commonly known as the Rema, was a major Polish Jewish legal scholar. Source: Wikipedia

His glosses on the Shulchan Aruch became particularly influential in Ashkenazi Jewish legal practice.

The Shulchan Aruch, meaning “Set Table,” was compiled by Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488–1575) and became one of the principal codes of Jewish law.

The Rema’s glosses supplied Ashkenazi customs and legal rulings where they differed from the Sephardic tradition represented by Karo.

In the 16th century, Jewish communities were broadly divided into two major cultural traditions:

Sephardic Jews: Originally from the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), with communities across the Mediterranean and Middle East.
Ashkenazi Jews: From Central and Eastern Europe (such as Germany, Poland, and Russia).

While both groups shared the same foundational legal texts (the Torah and the Talmud), their local customs, traditions, and practical rulings on daily life had evolved differently over centuries due to geography and history.

The Two Scholars

1. Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488–1575)

Rabbi Joseph Karo was a prominent Sephardic legal scholar. He wrote a landmark code of Jewish law called the Shulchan Aruch (which translates to “The Set Table”).

His goal was to provide a clear, unified reference book for Jewish law (Halakha). However, when compiling his rulings, Karo heavily favored the major Sephardic authorities and methods of his tradition. As a result, the Shulchan Aruch primarily reflected Sephardic practices and legal conclusions.

2. The Rema: Rabbi Moses Isserles (1530–1572)

Rabbi Moses Isserles (known by the acronym Rema) was a leading Polish-Ashkenazi scholar based in Kraków. He had actually been writing his own comprehensive code of Jewish law around the same time.

When Karo’s Shulchan Aruch was published, Isserles recognized its brilliance and decided not to publish a competing book. However, he knew that Ashkenazi communities could not adopt Karo’s code as written because it omitted many established Ashkenazi customs, traditions, and rabbinic precedents.

What “Glosses” Means

Instead of rewriting the book, the Rema added “glosses”, short commentary notes, qualifications, and additions inserted directly alongside Karo’s original text.

Where Karo stated a Sephardic legal ruling, the Rema’s gloss would step in to say, “However, the Ashkenazi custom is…” or “Later European authorities ruled that…”

The Rema named his additions the Mappah (“The Tablecloth”), designed to complement Karo’s “Set Table.”

Rabbinic & Historical Texts

Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin (56a–60b): Foundational derivation of the Seven Noahide Laws from Genesis.
Maimonides (Rambam), Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Melachim 8–10; Hilchot Avodah Zarah 9): Classical legal code on Noahide obligations, monotheism, and foreign worship.
Tosafot (Sanhedrin 63b, Bekhorot 2b): Medieval Talmudic commentaries establishing the concept of Shituf (association) for non-Jews.
The Rema (Rabbi Moses Isserles), Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 156:1): Codification of Shituf into standard Ashkenazi practice, viewing Christians as compliant monotheists under Noahide law.
The Me’iri, Beit HaBechirah: Categorized Christians and Muslims as ethical, religion-bound peoples rather than ancient pagans.

Rabbi Menachem Meiri

Rabbi Menachem ben Solomon Meiri (1249–1316), commonly called the Meiri, was a major medieval Jewish Talmudic scholar from Provence.

His extensive commentary, Beit HaBechirah, is particularly significant in discussions concerning Christianity and Islam, Rabbi Menachem ben Solomon HaMeiri (c. 1249–1315), a medieval Provençal Talmudist, authored Beit HaBechirah (“House of Choice”), a monumental commentary structuring the legal discussions of the Babylonian Talmud. The work is particularly significant in interfaith legal history because HaMeiri introduced a novel distinction regarding non-Jewish societies. He categorized Christians and Muslims under the heading of “nations bound by the ways of religion and ethics” (umot ha-gedurot be-darkhei ha-datot), distinguishing them from ancient pagan idolaters. By arguing that contemporary monotheistic communities observe moral norms and basic Noahide duties, Beit HaBechirah provided a framework in Jewish jurisprudence for mutual respect and social cooperation with Christian and Islamic societies (HaMeiri, c. 1300/1920; Katz, 1961) Source: Grokipedia.

Meiri distinguished the Christian and Muslim societies of his time from the pagan societies described in many earlier rabbinic discussions, referring to them as nations “bound by the ways of religion.”⁶

His treatment is important because it demonstrates that medieval Jewish thinking about Christianity was not completely uniform.

Rabbi Ezekiel Landau — the Noda BiYehuda

Rabbi Ezekiel Landau (1713–1793), known by the title of his major responsa collection, Noda BiYehuda, was a highly influential 18th-century Jewish legal authority. Source: Wikipedia

A responsum (teshuvah) is a written answer by a Jewish legal scholar to a particular question of Jewish law.

Landau’s writings illustrate the continuing complexity of Jewish legal reasoning concerning questions involving non-Jewish religious practice and legal categories. A responsum (plural: responsa; in Hebrew, teshuvah, meaning “answer”) is a formal written decision by a Jewish legal scholar addressing a specific query regarding Jewish law (Halakha). The extensive 18th-century responsa of Rabbi Ezekiel Landau (1713–1793), collected under the title Noda BiYehuda, provide a key historical example of this process in action. Sifting through complex precedents, Landau’s writings illustrate the continuing complexity of Jewish legal reasoning concerning questions involving non-Jewish religious practice and legal categories. His nuanced rulings demonstrate that rather than treating non-Jewish societies as a monolith, rabbinic authorities frequently revisited classical sources to re-examine obligations, oaths, and the precise boundaries of monotheism across different historical eras (Landau, 1776; Novick, 2011).

However, it is important to remember that we must not exaggerate what any one later authority proves. His discussions belong to particular legal contexts and should be cited when used to establish a specific proposition.

4. Technical Terms Explained

A non-Jewish reader can easily become lost in discussions of Noahide law because the literature uses Hebrew and Aramaic technical terminology.

Several terms therefore require explanation.

Halakhah

Halakhah is the traditional Jewish legal system or body of Jewish religious law.

The term derives from a Hebrew root associated with “walking” or “going,” conveying the idea of the way one lives.

Halakhah encompasses far more than criminal law. It includes religious duties, worship, food, family life, business relationships, festivals, prayer, ritual practice, and many other areas.

Avodah Zarah

Avodah Zarah literally means “foreign worship” or “strange worship.”

It is commonly translated into English as idolatry, although the technical Jewish legal category is more complex than the English word alone might suggest.

Maimonides’ classification of Christianity as Avodah Zarah is one of the reasons his treatment of Christianity is so significant in this discussion.⁷

Shituf

Shituf literally means “association,” “joining,” or “partnership.”

In discussions concerning Christianity, it refers to the association of the worship of the Creator with another figure or intermediary.

This concept became important in medieval Jewish discussions about Christians because some authorities distinguished the obligations of Jews from those of non-Jews.

The important point for our purposes is that shittuf should not be simplified into the statement “Judaism officially declares Christianity to be monotheistic.”

The historical discussion is more complicated.

Beit Din

Beit Din literally means “house of judgment.”

A beit din is a Jewish religious court dealing with matters of Jewish law.

Classical rabbinic literature also discusses courts in connection with the Noahide obligation to establish justice. The existence of such discussions, however, should not be confused with a modern rabbinical court possessing criminal jurisdiction over citizens of a sovereign state.

Ger Toshav

Ger Toshav literally means something like “resident stranger” or “resident alien.”

In classical Jewish law, it refers to a non-Jew residing in the Land of Israel under a particular legal status associated with acceptance of the Noahide commandments.

The category is therefore a classical halakhic category, and its applicability under modern political conditions is a separate legal question.

Olam Ha-Ba

Olam Ha-Ba means “the World to Come.”

Olam Ha-Ba is a Jewish theological concept concerning the future spiritual state or age to come. It should not simply be equated with the Christian concept of heaven, because Jewish sources use the term in a variety of related contexts.

5. Historical Rabbinic Debate Concerning Christianity

There are documented written pieces of evidence for Rabbis to establish that Jewish legal authorities have not always spoken with one voice concerning Christianity. There are substantial historical differences in how Christian worship was classified.

The reasons for historical Rabbinic debate are that modern internet discussions sometimes quote the strictest medieval position and present it as though every Jewish authority throughout history has held exactly the same view. That is historically untrue. At the same time, it would not be accurate to suggest that the lenient positions erase the existence of the stricter ones. While medieval authorities like Maimonides categorised Trinitarian doctrine as Avodah Zarah (foreign worship), others such as Rabbeinu Tam, the Tosafists, and the Rema developed the principle of Shituf (association), ruling that non-Jews worshipping the Creator alongside an intermediary remain compliant with Noahide law (Breitowitz, 2023; Katz, 1961).

Primary & Academic References

Tosafot. (c. 12th–13th Century). Commentary on Talmud Sanhedrin 63b & Bekhorot 2b. (Establishes the foundational legal distinction of Shituf).

Breitowitz, Rabbi Dr. Yitzchak. (2023). “Noahide Law and Christianity.” Video Lecture, Hidabroot – Torah & Judaism. (Comprehensive overview of the contrasting historical halakhic opinions regarding Christian theology).

Isserles, Rabbi Moses (The Rema). (c. 1570). Shulchan Aruch: Orach Chaim 156:1. (Codifies the lenient principle of Shituf into standard Ashkenazi legal practice).

Katz, Jacob. (1961). Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Definitive academic study detailing the spectrum of rabbinic rulings on Christianity).

Maimonides (Rambam). (c. 1180). Mishneh Torah: Hilchot Avodah Zarah 9:4; Hilchot Melachim 8:11. (Represents the strict legal classification of Christian theology).

Maimonides and the Strict Classification

Maimonides is among the most important authorities representing the strict approach. His legal writings contain an explicit classification of Christianity as Avodah Zarah in passages dealing with Christian worship. Modern scholarship has examined Maimonides’ treatment of Christianity precisely because of his distinction between Christianity, Islam, and paganism (Novak, 2019). His understanding of God’s absolute unity and incorporeality made Trinitarian and incarnational Christian theology fundamentally incompatible with his conception of Jewish monotheism (Maimonides, c. 1180). Consequently, Christians should not simply dismiss the claim that some classical Jewish authorities regarded Christianity as idolatrous. There is genuine primary-source evidence for that position. However, it would be equally misleading to conclude from Maimonides alone that there has never been a contrary Jewish legal position. There was (Breitowitz, 2023; Katz, 1961).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTDg8FCaxrg

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/harvard-theological-review/article/abs/uncensored-recovering-antichristian-animosity-in-contemporary-rabbinic-literature/E25E3D336C88CEC47837DA092D9785B3

References

Breitowitz, Rabbi Dr. Yitzchak. (2023). “Noahide Law and Christianity.” Video Lecture, Hidabroot – Torah & Judaism. (Outlines the contrast between Maimonides’ strict ruling and the later lenient consensus based on Shituf).
Katz, Jacob. (1961). Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Definitive history of the spectrum of halakhic opinions regarding Christianity).
Maimonides (Rambam). (c. 1180). Mishneh Torah: Hilchot Avodah Zarah 9:4; Hilchot Melachim 8:11. (Primary source text establishing Maimonides’ strict legal classification).
Novak, David. (2019). “Maimonides’ Treatment of Christianity and its Normative Implications.” In A. Goshen-Gottstein & E. Korn (Eds.), Jewish Theology and World Religions. Cambridge University Press. (Academic analysis of Maimonides’ distinctions between non-Jewish religious traditions).
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/912368/jewish/Avodat-Kochavim-Chapter-9.htm

The Tosafists, Rabbeinu Tam, and the Question of Shituf

When many Christians look into this, they miss important points, and this is overlooked in discussions about Noahide law and Christianity. So far, I have not read or seen where Jewish writers agree on Christian worship. While Maimonides (Rambam) adopted a strict position regarding Christianity and idolatry, other influential rabbinic authorities approached the issue differently.

There is an example from the Tosafists: many were descendants, students, or relatives of the famous rabbi and commentator Rashi (1040 – 1105).

Who Are the Tosafists?

The Tosafists (Ba’alei HaTosafot, “authors of the additions”) were a group of medieval Jewish rabbis and Talmudic commentators who lived primarily in northern France and Germany between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Many were descendants, students, or intellectual heirs of the renowned commentator Rashi (1040–1105), and their commentaries became a central part of the traditional Talmudic text. (Grossman, 1995; Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed.; Ta-Shma, 2006).

The tradition is associated with Rabbeinu Tam, one of the most respected medieval Jewish scholars. In their commentary on the Talmud (Sanhedrin 63b), the Tosafists discuss the question of Christian oaths and the way Christians refer to God. They acknowledge that Christians associate “something else” with the Creator, a concept that later became connected with what is commonly known as shituf (“association”).

Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 35–44.

However, this discussion is often oversimplified by both critics and defenders of Noahide teaching.

The Tosafists were not declaring Christianity to be theologically correct, nor were they abandoning traditional Jewish objections to core Christian doctrines such as the Trinity or the Incarnation. Rather, they were making a doctrinal legal distinction within Jewish law. Their argument concerned how certain Christian religious practices should be classified when determining legal (theological) interactions between Jews and Christians.

This distinction proved particularly significant in medieval Europe, where Jewish communities regularly conducted business, entered agreements, and lived alongside Christian populations. The practical question was not whether Christianity was true, but how Jewish law should regulate relationships with Christians in everyday life.

As a result, a more nuanced position emerged. Christianity continued to be viewed as theologically problematic from a traditional Jewish perspective; As a result, Christianity continued to be viewed as theologically incompatible with Jewish monotheism from a traditional Jewish perspective. The central points of objection included the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the belief that God became incarnate in Jesus Christ, and the Christian practice of worshipping Jesus as divine. From the perspective of strict Jewish monotheism, these doctrines raised fundamental questions about the absolute unity and incorporeality of God.

This distinction is important when looking at the subject of noahideism. If Christians should support any noahide movement, Christians should understand the position taught by the ribbies, because the shituf position meant that some rabbinic authorities made a legal distinction for how Christianity was treated in relation to non-Jews. It did not mean they believed the Trinity or the divinity of Jesus were theologically correct. In other words, a Christian could be treated differently under certain areas of Jewish law without Jewish authorities accepting Christian doctrine as true.

Rather, it concerned how Christianity and Christian practices were to be classified and treated under particular areas of Jewish law (Theologically). Some authorities argued that it should not necessarily be treated in the same category as classical paganism when applied to non-Jews.

This is an important point because it demonstrates that historical rabbinic discussions about Christianity were far more complex than many modern presentations suggest. It is therefore inaccurate to claim that all rabbinic authorities viewed Christianity in exactly the same way, just as it would be inaccurate to suggest that the shituf position removed all Jewish theological objections to Christianity.

There is an ongoing debate within Jewish legal thought, with various authorities seeking to navigate the relationship among Jewish monotheism, Christian theology, and the practical realities of life in a predominantly Christian world.

For Christians examining the Noahide movement today, this distinction matters because it highlights the fact that there has never been a single, unanimous rabbinic position regarding Christianity’s status under Noahide law. Any serious discussion of the subject must therefore acknowledge the diversity of opinion that has existed within Jewish jurisprudence for centuries.

References

David Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Literary Reader (Oxford University Press, 1989).

Tosafot on Sanhedrin 63b; Tosafot on Bekhorot 2b.

Rabbi Moses Isserles (Rema), Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 156:1.

Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 1961).

The Rema and Ashkenazi Practice

Rabbi Moses Isserles, known as the Rema, was one of the most influential Jewish legal authorities in Ashkenazi Judaism. His writings became an important part of later Ashkenazi halakhic practice.

Debates and Jewish writings about Christianity show that later Jewish authorities interpreted the principle of shittuf in different ways.

Strict view: associating anything with God constitutes idolatry.
Shittuf view: there can be a legal distinction for non-Jews who associate another figure with God, even though the theology itself is not accepted as Jewish theology.

The important point is that shittuf should not be understood as a declaration that the Rabbis who promote this view are declaring that Christianity is theologically true or that Jewish authorities accepted the Christian doctrine of the Trinity or the divinity of Jesus.

Rather, it represents a theological distinction concerning how the religious practices of non-Jews were classified under particular circumstances. This is why it would be inaccurate to make either of two sweeping claims: that the Rema declared Christianity to be true monotheism, or that every Jewish authority has always classified Christianity in exactly the same way.

The more historically accurate conclusion is that Jewish legal literature contains both stricter and more lenient approaches to Christianity, including the shittuf position, which distinguishes in certain respects between the religious obligations of Jews and those of non-Jews.

For the purposes of this article, when studying the subject of noahidism, we must make this distinction because there is no single, uncomplicated rabbinic position on how Christianity is classified. The debate is rooted in centuries of Jewish legal and theological discussion, and it must be understood within that historical context rather than reduced to a single statement about what “Judaism” believes.

References for the section

1. The Rema and Ashkenazi practice

The primary source is:

Isserles, Moses (Rema). Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 156:1.

This is the key later Ashkenazi legal source associated with the shittuf discussion. I would cite the Rema directly rather than saying he simply “declared Christianity to be monotheism.”

2. The earlier Tosafist/Rabbeinu Tam discussion

Tosafot, Sanhedrin 63b.

This is important because the shittuf discussion has roots in the Tosafist treatment of Christian oaths and the question of associating another figure with God.

3. Historical context

For the broader Jewish-Christian legal context:

Katz, Jacob. Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Katz is particularly useful for explaining why these legal distinctions mattered in medieval Jewish-Christian relations.

4. Modern scholarly discussion

You can also use:

Novak, David. Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Novak discusses the boundaries between Jewish and Christian theology and the legal/theological questions surrounding shittuf.

10. See Tosafot, Sanhedrin 63b; Moses Isserles (Rema), Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 156:1; Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); David Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Rabbi Meiri: Another Important Rabbinic Distinction

Medieval Jewish authorities have developed different approaches to the theological status of Christians, Muslims, and other non-Jewish peoples. One of the most significant figures in this discussion is Rabbi Menachem ben Solomon HaMeiri (c. 1249–1315/16), a major Provençal Talmudist and the author of Beit HaBechirah, an extensive commentary on the Talmud.[1]

Rabbi Meiri is particularly important because he repeatedly distinguished the religious societies of his own era from the ancient pagan societies that are the subject of many Talmudic discussions concerning avodah zarah (definition of idolatry).

“Nations Bounded by the Ways of Religion”

In his writings on Avodah Zarah 2a, Rabbi Meiri makes one of his most important distinctions:

He writes, in substance, that nations “bounded by the ways of religions” that believe in God’s existence, unity, and power, although they are mistaken in certain matters according to Jewish belief, are not subject to the restrictions under discussion.[2]

Rabbi Meiri does not merely say that contemporary non-Jews are socially respectable. He explicitly identifies a category of people who possess religious belief, belief in God, and a regulated moral and social order, while simultaneously acknowledging that their beliefs contain errors from the Jewish perspective that Christians would not agree.

Rabbi Meiri repeatedly employs this distinction throughout Beit HaBechirah. In his discussion of returning lost property in Bava Kamma 113b, for example, he distinguishes ancient peoples who were not “bounded by the ways of religion” from religiously ordered nations that worship God, even though their beliefs are “distant from Judaism’s religious belief.”[3]

Beit HaBechirah literally means “House of Choice” or “Chosen House.” In Maimonides’ terminology, it refers to the Temple in Jerusalem, particularly the Temple as the chosen place of worship.

Rabbi Meiri’s comments are not isolated; they are part of a recurring framework within Rabbi Meiri’s treatment of Christian theology.

What Did Rabbi Meiri Mean?

Rabbi Meiri’s distinction appears to involve both religious belief and moral conduct.

He compares the ancient pagan societies discussed in many rabbinic passages with societies governed by religion, law, and accepted standards of conduct. In another discussion, he describes the ancient peoples as being characterised by religious and moral corruption, whereas nations governed by religious and social norms punish such conduct.[4]

Consequently, it is more accurate to describe Rabbi Meiri’s category as religiously and morally ordered societies rather than simply calling them “tolerant” or “ethical.”

This distinction had practical halakhic consequences. The Meiri used it to limit or remove several restrictions concerning non-Jews, including rules relating to commercial dealings, returning lost property, and assisting non-Jews in circumstances where the Talmud’s original discussion concerned ancient idolaters.[5] This distinction affected how Jewish religious law was applied in practical situations involving Christians and Muslims.

David Novak has therefore described the Meiri as one of the most important late-medieval thinkers in the development of the Jewish conception of Noahide law. Novak argues that the Meiri extended the Noahide framework to contemporary non-Jewish societies and explicitly maintained that there were no idolaters in his own world comparable to the ancient pagans described by the rabbis.[6]

The Meiri and Christianity

The significance of this position becomes particularly clear when Christianity is considered.

The Meiri lived in Christian Europe and repeatedly distinguished the Christian and Muslim societies of his own time from the pagan societies discussed in the Talmud. His language concerning religious societies that believe in God’s existence, unity, and power is plainly incompatible with the simplistic claim that every medieval Jewish authority automatically regarded Christians in exactly the same legal category as ancient pagan idolaters.[7]

At the same time, the Meiri should not be presented as accepting Christianity as theologically true.

His own wording explicitly says that such people are mistaken in certain matters “according to our belief.” His purpose was therefore not to endorse Christian theology or suggest that Christianity was theologically correct. Rather, he was making a distinction in Jewish religious law: he argued that Christians and Muslims living in religiously and morally ordered societies should not automatically be treated under the same legal rules that earlier rabbis had applied to ancient pagan idolaters. In practical terms, this affected what Jews were permitted, required, or forbidden to do when dealing with Christians and Muslims, including matters such as business dealings, returning lost property, and other forms of interaction.

Rabbi Meiri’s position was a legal and social classification, not a conversion to Christian theology.

He remained a Jewish halakhic scholar. His recognition of Christian society as religiously ordered did not mean that he accepted Christian claims concerning Jesus, the Incarnation, or the Trinity. Those doctrines should not be attributed to Rabbi Meiri as beliefs he accepted. Rather, his writings show that he could distinguish between rejecting Christian theology and determining whether the Christians of his era should be treated in halakhah exactly like the ancient idolaters described in the Talmud.

Halakhah is the traditional Jewish system of religious law and practice that guides how Jews are expected to live and conduct their daily lives. It covers far more than worship and religious rituals, including matters such as prayer, food, festivals, family life, business dealings, property, and relationships with other people. Halakhah developed from the Hebrew Bible and the traditions and interpretations of Jewish rabbis, including the Mishnah, Talmud, later legal writings, codes, and rabbinic decisions. In simple terms, halakhah means the body of Jewish religious laws and practical rules that guide Jewish life.

https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/55830

The Meiri Compared with Maimonides

The difference between Rabbi Meiri and the earlier Jewish scholar Maimonides (Rambam) is important because it shows that Jewish scholars did not all take exactly the same position concerning Christianity.

Maimonides took a much stricter view. In his Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry (Hilchot Avodah Zarah) 9:4, he explicitly states:

הנוצרים עובדי עבודה זרה הן

“The Christians are idolaters.” [8]

In other words, Maimonides placed Christianity within the Jewish legal category of idolatry (avodah zarah) with regard to noahides. He also makes a similar classification in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 1:3, where he describes Christians and their religious practices in terms of idolatry. [9]

This is important because it compares to the writings of Rabbi Meiri. Rabbi Meiri did not simply apply the same category used for the ancient pagan peoples discussed in the Talmud to the Christian and Muslim societies of his own time. Instead, he repeatedly distinguished societies governed by religious and moral laws from the ancient idolaters who were the original subject of many of those rabbinic restrictions.

This does not mean that Rabbi Meiri accepted Christianity as theologically true. He remained a Jewish scholar and authority on Jewish religious law. Rather, his approach shows that a Jewish scholar could reject Christian theology while still making a different legal distinction concerning how Christians should be treated in everyday Jewish law.

Therefore, it would be historically inaccurate to suggest that there was one completely uniform Jewish position on Christianity throughout the medieval period; this may have shaped modern Noahide groups’ thinking when looking at Christian theology. Maimonides represents a much stricter classification of Christianity as idolatry, while the Meiri developed a different approach to the legal treatment of contemporary Christian and Muslim societies.

The Tosafist Concept of Shituf

The Tosafists were a group of influential medieval Jewish rabbis and commentators who lived mainly in France and Germany from roughly the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. Their writings provide another important example of differences in Jewish thinking about Christianity.

One concept that became significant in this discussion was shituf, a Hebrew word meaning “association” or “joining together.” The idea appears in Tosafist discussions concerning Christian belief in the Christian Trinity. A famous Tosafist statement says:

אין בני נח מוזהרין על השיתוף

“The descendants of Noah are not warned concerning association.”

The basic idea was that the Tosafists recognised that Christians believed in God together with Jesus, which was different from the Jewish understanding of God’s absolute oneness. However, they argued that non-Jews were not necessarily bound by the same rules concerning this belief that applied to Jews. This meant that Jews could still have certain everyday dealings with Christians, such as doing business with them or dealing with them in matters involving oaths, without necessarily being forbidden from doing so under Jewish religious law.

However, shituf should not be understood to mean that the Tosafists believed Christianity was true or agreed with Christian teaching. They were making a specific point about Jewish religious law: although Christians held beliefs that Jewish Rabbies considered incorrect, the Tosafists argued that Jews were not necessarily required to treat Christians in the same way as Jews would be prohibited from associating with such beliefs themselves. This allowed certain everyday dealings between Jews and Christians, including some business transactions and matters involving oaths.

This is an important difference between the Tosafists and the Meiri. The Tosafists were mainly addressing a specific question about Christian beliefs. Rabbi Meiri went further, arguing that the Christian and Muslim societies of his time should not simply be treated in the same way as the ancient pagan societies discussed in earlier Jewish writings.

Taken together, these sources show that medieval Jewish scholars did not all view Christianity in exactly the same way. Maimonides described Christianity as idolatry. The Tosafists developed the idea of shituf to explain why certain Jewish laws could be applied differently when dealing with Christians. Rabbi Meiri went further, distinguishing the Christian and Muslim societies of his time from the ancient pagan societies discussed in earlier Jewish writings.

None of these positions means that these Jewish scholars accepted Christian teaching as true. Instead, they show that Jewish scholars developed different ways of deciding how Jews should understand and deal with Christians in everyday life.

Why the Meiri Matters for Christian Apologetics

The history of Jewish thinking about Christianity is important for Christian apologetics because it helps us avoid making sweeping claims about what “Judaism teaches” concerning Christians, Christianity, or non-Jews. The medieval Jewish sources do not present one completely uniform position. Different Jewish scholars reached different conclusions about how Christians should be viewed and treated under Jewish religious law.

Jewish Scholars Did Not All Take the Same Position

It is historically inaccurate to take the strictest medieval Jewish position and present it as though every Jewish authority throughout history held exactly the same view.

For example, Maimonides explicitly classified Christianity as avodah zarah, meaning idolatry. The Tosafists, however, developed the idea of shituf to deal with certain practical questions concerning Christian belief and Jewish interaction with Christians. The Meiri went further by distinguishing the Christian and Muslim societies of his own time from the ancient pagan societies discussed in earlier Jewish writings.

These differences are important because they demonstrate that medieval Jewish scholars did not all approach Christianity in exactly the same way. There was genuine disagreement and development within Jewish religious law.

The Meiri’s Position Was More Than Simply Saying Christians Were “Good People”

It is also important not to reduce the Meiri’s position to simple tolerance or kindness toward Christians.

Rabbi Meiri’s distinction affected how he understood and applied specific Jewish laws concerning non-Jews. He argued that many of the strict rules discussed in the Talmud and earlier rabbinic writings concerning idolaters were directed toward ancient pagan societies and should not automatically be applied in exactly the same way to the religiously and morally ordered societies of his own time.

This had practical consequences for Jewish life. His writings addressed questions involving business dealings, returning lost property, helping non-Jews, protection from harm, religious festivals, and other forms of interaction between Jews and non-Jews.

In other words, the Meiri was not merely making a statement about how Christians and Muslims should be viewed socially. He was making a legal distinction that affected how Jewish religious law was applied when dealing with the religious societies around him.

References: Meiri, Beit HaBechirah, Avodah Zarah 2a, 20a, 26a–b; Bava Kamma 113b. See also David Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: A Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp. 195–205; Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom: Rabbi Menahem HaMeiri and the Maimonidean Halakhists of Provence (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000).

Rabbi Meiri Did Not Accept Christianity as True

Rabbi Meiri repeatedly distinguishes contemporary Christians and Muslims from the ancient idolaters discussed in many Talmudic passages, describing them as “nations bound by the ways of religion” (umot ha-gedurot be-darkhei ha-datot). At the same time, he makes clear that this legal distinction does not imply acceptance of their theology. He explicitly states that such peoples are mistaken in certain matters “according to our belief” (lefi emunatenu). Thus, the Meiri could recognize the moral and religious order of Christian and Muslim societies while continuing to reject their theological claims from a Jewish perspective.

References: Meiri, Beit HaBechirah, Avodah Zarah 2a–2b, 20a, 26a–b, and 35b–36a; Bava Kamma 113b. See also Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 114–128; David Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: A Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp. 195–205; Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom: Rabbi Menahem Ha-Meiri and the Maimonidean Halakhists of Provence (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000); Irving Greenberg, For the Sake of Heaven and Earth: The New Encounter Between Judaism and Christianity (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2004), p. 46.

There Is Still Scholarly Debate About Rabbi Meiri

There is also an important scholarly debate concerning how Rabbi Meiri’s position should be understood.

Rabbi Meiri’s own words demonstrate that his distinction was not simply an expression of social tolerance or kindness toward Christians and Muslims. In his commentary on Gittin 62a, he describes certain nations as “bound by the ways of religion” and says that they believe in the existence of God, His unity, and His power. At the same time, he acknowledges that they are “slightly confused according to our faith.” The Meiri therefore recognised the religious and moral character of these societies while still maintaining that, from the perspective of Jewish belief, they were mistaken in certain matters. His distinction also had practical legal consequences. In his commentary on Bava Kamma 37b, he distinguishes between peoples who are “not bound by the ways of religion and norms” and societies that are governed by religious and moral standards. This shows that the Meiri was not merely expressing a favourable social opinion about Christians and Muslims; he was using a distinction between different types of non-Jewish societies when explaining how particular areas of Jewish religious law should be applied.

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Some scholars have emphasised the influence of the social and political circumstances in which the Meiri lived. Jacob Katz, for example, interpreted the Meiri’s approach within the wider development of Jewish relations with the Christian society of medieval Europe. Other scholars have placed greater emphasis on the internal logic of the Meiri’s legal and philosophical system. Moshe Halbertal, for example, treats the Meiri’s distinction as an important and systematic element of his thought rather than simply a temporary accommodation to changing circumstances. Modern scholarship therefore continues to debate both the origins of the Meiri’s approach and how innovative or far-reaching his position actually was.

References: Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 114–128; Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom: Rabbi Menahem Ha-Meiri and the Maimonidean Halakhists of Provence (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000); Ari Milevsky, “A Positive Light on the Nations,” Hakirah 28, which surveys the modern scholarly debate and cites Katz, Halbertal, and other scholars.
https://hakirah.org/vol28Milevsky.pdf

For this reason, the safest historical conclusion is to avoid both extremes.

We should not dismiss Rabbi Meiri’s statements. His writings contain a clear and repeated distinction between ancient pagan societies and the religious societies of his own time, and that distinction affected how he applied Jewish religious law to non-Jews.

At the same time, we should not exaggerate his position. The Meiri did not endorse Christianity or accept Christian theology as true. Rather, he developed a distinctive theological framework for understanding how Jews should relate to the religious societies around them while maintaining traditional Jewish theological beliefs.

References: Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 114–128; Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom: Rabbi Menahem Ha-Meiri and the Maimonidean Halakhists of Provence (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000); David Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: A Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp. 195–205.

Why This Matters

For Christians studying the modern Noahide movement, this history is particularly important.

Claims are sometimes made that there has always been one single, unchanging Jewish position concerning Christianity, idolatry, and the status of non-Jews. The medieval sources demonstrate that the reality is more complicated.

Maimonides, the Tosafists, and the Meiri provide three important examples of different approaches. Maimonides explicitly classified Christianity as idolatry. The Tosafists developed shituf to address certain practical questions concerning Christians. The Meiri developed a broader distinction between ancient pagan societies and contemporary religious societies.

None of these positions means that these Jewish scholars accepted Christianity as true. Instead, they demonstrate that Jewish scholars developed different ways of deciding how Jews should understand and deal with Christians in everyday life.

For Christian apologetics, this matters because our arguments should be based on accurate history rather than oversimplification. We do not need to exaggerate Jewish sources to defend Christianity. In fact, acknowledging the differences between Jewish scholars makes the argument stronger because it demonstrates that we have examined the historical evidence fairly.

Ultimately, however, the Christian faith does not stand or fall on the opinion of Maimonides, the Tosafists, the Meiri, or any other rabbinic authority.

The central question for Christianity remains the identity of Jesus Christ: who He is, what He accomplished through His death and resurrection, and whether the Gospel’s claim that salvation is found through faith in Him is true.